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iglGOVERNMENT  POLICY IN  SUPPORT OF DOMESTIC  AGRICULTURE:  COSTS  AND  BENEFITS
The  European  Community
Michel Petit
Two quotations from Corden (1974) express well opinions  widely  held  among
economists belonging to the broad neoclassical tradition  about  European
agricultural  policy,  particularly  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP)  of  the
European  Economic  Community  (EEC).
It  is  protectionist: "Historically, one of the main reasons for the imposition
of protective tariffs in  the now-advanced countries has been to prevent
changes in  internal income distribution that would otherwise  have  taken  place
as  a  result of  market  forces."
It  is  outdated and should be revised:  "The two outstanding  cases  (of  the
senescent industry argument) are the protection of  continental  European
agriculture since the  late nineteenth century and the  worldwide  protection  of
the textile industry in  recent years."
In  this perspective it  is  legitimate  to ask:  how was  such  a  policy
orientation chosen and maintained since the latter  19th  century?  And,  what
are the implications of such a  choice, particularly what  are  the  costs
associated with this policy?  These are the questions, which as I  understand,
the organizers of the workshop have addressed to me.  I  have been asked to
concentrate on the domestic aspects, since other contributors will discuss the
international,  trade and aid issues raised by EEC agricultural policies.  But,
the decision to protect European agriculture has been  a  strategic  choice  which
has dominated all other aspects of domestic agricultural policies.  Thus,  I
interpret my task as assessing the domestic  implications, and particularly the
domestic costs, of this general, agricultural policy  orientation.
As I  have reservations with the concept of cost applied  to  policy  analysis,
the thrust of my paper will be devoted,  first, to a  restatement  of  the  problem
which leads economists to elaborate analyses in  terms  of  costs.  Thereby,  I
hope to show the limits  of the concept of cost applied to policy analysis.
Then,  I  attempt  to  derive  and  to  compare  the  various  implications  of  possible
changes in  current policies.  It  may then be appropriate to  speak in  terms of
cost, and,  thus,  to show how the concept can be useful in  shedding light on
policy choices.
Restating the problem will imply, first, a sketch of the historical background
in  which policies were elaborated and evolved, and,  second, a  brief
description of the essential features of these policies.  These two tasks will
be  undertaken  in the  first and  second  part of  this  paper before  turning,  in
the third part, to the discussion in  terms of costs.
Historical Background
European agricultural policy  has  a  long  history.  It  is  essential  to  take  this
history into account if  one wants to understand the current setting.  A  key
period was the 1870's and 1880's when European countries reacted differently
to the competition resulting from progress in  transportation techniques which
brought  grains  from  new  countries  of  North  and  South  America  and  from  Russia
at prices  well-below  levels  deemed  acceptable  for  European producers.  Policy
41orientations  decided at that time have had a long-lasting  influence.  One  has
to wait until the fifties and sixties, when the European  Common  Market  was
established,  to witness another turning point of potentially  the  same
historical importance.  As is well known, some countries chose to protect
their agriculture, such is the  case of Germany and France.  Others  chose  to
keep their frontiers open, the best known example, and  probably  the  most
extreme one as well, of that orientation is the United Kingdom (UK).  Other
countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands followed  suit.  The  United
Kingdom appears to have totally sacrificed its agriculture  at  that  time  _/,
whereas Denmark and the Netherlands purposively increased their cereal imports
in order to feed a considerably expanded  livestock population.  It  is,  of
course, well beyond the scope of this paper--and beyond  the  competence  of  this
writer--to review historical  developments in the 10 countries,  presently
members  of  the  EEC.  But,  for  our  purpose  here  it  will  probably  be  sufficient
to  review the main  developments  in France, Germany,  and  the  United  Kingdom.
These three sharply contrasting  cases cover a wide range of problems which
continue to weigh.
France.  Most observers agree that the decisive choice in favor of
agricultural protectionism was made in the late 1870's  in  order  to  secure  an
alliance between the peasants and the bourgeoisie against  the  workers  (8).  It
must be remembered that just after the Franco-Prussian War, the Commune of
Paris  uprising--the fourth  attempt  at  revolution  in  less  than  a  century--was
bloodily crushed.  Fighting the socialist  ideas was to  be,  for  the  next
decades, a constant objective and an essential task of  the  dominant  social
groups and of the successive governments.
In this  perspective,  the  first  role  of  agricultural  policy  was  ideological.
In order to ensure social peace, private property ownership  by  small  farm
operators was viewed as critical.  Their ruin would have  been  seen  as  a
socio-political  catastrophe;  a  major migration  out  of  agriculture  could  only
have swollen the ranks of the troublesome and feared urban proletariat.
Political stability rested on an electoral system heavily biased in favor of
the rural areas.  In addition to protection from outside  competition,  the
implicit social compact provided farm operators with  a  liberation  from  the  old
exploitative economic and social relationships in which they were involved.
Accordingly, cooperative and mutual credit  institutions were encouraged to
fight the  local monopoly power of merchants;  primary education was made
mandatory to reduce the  influence of the royalist clergy, and efforts were
made to promote technical progress in agriculture.  Because the latter were
not successful, the protectionist policy was  strongly criticized by, among
others  (1),  who accused protectionism of having fossilized an antiquated
structure.  He  felt  that  many  small  peasant  farms  incapable  of  adapting  to
modern techniques had survived, at the expense of  the general economy and of
1/  Kirk  (16)  reports that the President  of  the  Board  of  Agriculture  is  said
to  have  remarked  (in  about 1908):  "The  business  of  the  Board  is  to  preside
over the demise of British agriculture, and  to make sure that  it gets a decent
funeral."  Whether  this  was  actually  said  or  not  does  not matter much  here.
The  mere  fact  that it  is  plausible  is  itself  very  revealing.
42the peasants themselves,  who were the  .victims of too interested protectors,
eager to keep their own dominating role.  But such a point of view, even
though it was widely shared during the expansionist period of the fifties and
sixties,  is probably much too simplistie.
Ruttan, in a Short but very perceptive article, has emphasized that the
technical stagnation of French agriculture and.  the relatively highproportion
of the working population kept in that sector until World War II could very
well be explained by the sluggish consumer demand related to the demographic
stagnation and the modest rate  :.of  industria  l growth.  Gervaiand TaVerier
(8) have emphasized additional factors  which  imst be taken into account if one
is  to fully understand the logic behind the policy orientation chosen in the
latter 19th century.  The savings function performed by the farmers and the
level of protection provided by the Meline Tariff of 1892 was not very high.
It is  indeed particularly significant that agriculture was a net supplier of
financial resources to  the.  rest of  the economy.  Thus  g  ricultural policy
appears, during that period, as the resuit of a difficult compromise among
many diverse objectives, of both a political and an economic nature.  Contrary
to the naive  liberal doctrine, -it.  is  -:not certain that agricultural protection
over more than 60 years  led to a serious misallocation of resources
Undoubtedly it would have been possible to produce more,.  with a  omre
widespread use of modern techniques.  But, was there a market for such
increased production?  How much capital would this have required?  Where wouid
the Labor thus  liberated have.  gone? 'What would have been the social and
political "costs"  of such a change in policy?
After World War II,  economic conditions  changed drastically; the general
policy orientation was seriously shifted, even-  if protectionismremained a
major feature of the new policy,  With.the needs of, first, reconstruction
and, then, general economic growth, agricultural production was encouraged,
technical progress was promoted-credit developed.  The demand for labor in
industry and other sectors-  accelerated the.movement of people.out of
agriculture, and this, as..wel  as  farm consolidation, was supported by various
structural policies.  It-  is true that soon farmsurpluses occurred.  Thus
Government intervention on domestic markets, whh  had  tartted for wheat in
1936, was expanded to several products, .:such  as other grains, meat, milk, and
fruits.  Again, it was  -deemed necessary to protect  :farmers  first from market
instability and,  soon, also  .from the general  .tendency of agriculture to over
supply--  the famous treadmill of Cochrane.  The order of the day was not a
restoration of free international trade for asgricultural products; and the  sad
experience of  the United Kingdom during the war did not render such a- -   -
proposition very attractive either.
United Kingdom.  As Kirk has emphasized, the situation in the late 19th
century was unique (16).  The severe fall  in grain prices, which occurred in
1873, and which was not followed by a recovery as  the general economic
depression wore off, did not lead to a major policydecision.  In a way it can
be argued  that the case for free trade had been decisively won earlier with
the repeal of  the Corn Law.  Nevertheless, it must be recognized that whatever
was decided, or not decided, was so done in the teeth of the farming  interest
in the Lower House of Parl  iament,  and of the even stronger landlord interest
in the House of Lords.  A more powerful interest prevailed.  This was the
interest of the industrial urban population in cheap food, and its evident
intention--made  manifest  at  more  than  one  general  eleetio.n--offurthering.that
interest  by  its  voting  power.  For  the  same  author  tis laisse Zfaire  attitude
essentially  ended  however  with World  War  I.
43The Corn Production Act  (1917) provided high prices  for cereals, supported by
Government grants.  This support continued until 1921 when the Act was
repealed.  This, of course, was a reduction in the degree of protection and
was viewed as a "betrayal" by farmers.  But, it  did not signal the end of
Government intervention in agriculture.  Support to sugarbeets was  introduced
in  1924, an Agricultural Credits Act was passed in  1923,  and agricultural
wages were regulated in  1924.  Rural infrastructure (roads, electricity, and
public water) was developed earlier than in  other European countries and this
certainly favored the later development of milk production.
The crisis of the thirties  led, in  spite of  considerable ideological
opposition 2/,  to a  growing degree of Government intervention:  promotion of
collective market power by farmers through "agricultural marketing schemes"
and quantitative regulation of imports through negotiations with supplying
countries by the Market Supply Committee.  This pragmatic device had the
advantage of permitting liberal terms to the Dominions, in  line with the
"imperial preference,"  and harder ones for a  country such as Denmark.  For
wheat a  levy-subsidy system was  introduced to support prices near a  target
level.  All these measures set the stage for a  major achievement of British
agriculture during World War II. It  managed to provide the population with
enough food to survive and fight the war.  It  is  true that  large quantities
were  imported, but, in  6  years, the domestic food production, measured in
calories, almost doubled,  thanks in  particular to a  major shift from animal to
vegetable products.  It  is  not surprising that after such a  performance,
administered by a  Government working in  close collaboration with farmers'
representatives,  the leading farm organization, the National Farmers Union,
emerged  as a  powerful pressure group.  Thus,  farmers were able to avoid  the
"betrayal" they had faced after World War I  when the Corn Pro4uction Act was
repealed.  As reported by Tracy, the "Labor Government passed the Agriculture
Act in  1947,  and undertook to buy at fixed prices the whole domestic output of
grains, potatoes, sugar beets and fatstock.  The Conservative Government which
returned to power in  1951 changed the method, dismantling food controls and
substituting deficiency payments, but maintained  the aims." 3/
Concern with the cost of such support, which was continuously growing as
domestic production expanded and world prices declined in  real terms, was
permanent, and the case for support to agriculture always questioned by
economists.  In  1961,  the Minister of Agriculture stated that the system of
support would have to be changed whether or not the United Kingdom joined the
European Community.  Under such pressure, the position of agriculture
regressed constantly.  In spite of the Annual Price Reviews, "farm prices were
on the whole held down in  the U.K. by successive Governments:  between 1956
and 1970,  the overall agricultural price index rose only 10 percent, while the
retail price index (all commodities)  rose 65  percent." 4/  After having peaked
at 340 million pounds in  1961, the cost of support never exceeded 300 million
after 1964.
Germany.  The protectionist choice was also very much the result of the
particular political situation.  The movement toward German unity had been
favored by the establishment of a  German customs union, the "Zollverein" in
1834.  Tariffs on grain were lifted in  1865.  But, German producers  lost their
British export market, and the trend toward free trade was reversed by the
2/  Kirk writes of  an "ideology of  financial rectitude" (16, p.  16).
_/ (23),  p.  10.
4/  The  agricultural price  crisis  of  the  last quarter of  the  19th  century
had been overcome.
44Tariff Acts  of 1989-80.  As explained by Cecil (1979),  this "brought both
heavy industry and the great estates into  line behind Bismark.  The effect was
to affirm the political power of  the Junkers,  as well as to preserve a
substantial agricultural sector within the economy."  Forging  the alliance
between "rye and iron" Bismark was  thus able to  fight the socialists of  the
Social Democratic Party (SPD) who took more to heart the  interests of  the
urban masses than those of the peasants, who were assumed to disappear soon
into the ranks of the urban proletariat. 5/  The establishment of a Federal
tariff had the added advantage of providing the "Reich" with much needed
finance as German unity was not yet very solid.  When he replaced Bismark as
chancellor, Caprivi had to renegotiate the expiring trade agreements.  He
maintained the industrial tariffs,  but in an effort  to appease trading
partners he made concessions on agricultural duties.  This  led  to opposition
from farmers who got organized in the "Bund der Landwirte--BdL,"  this
organization was instrumental in bringing about the fall of Caprivi  in 1894.
Eight years  later when the treaties negotiated by Caprivi expired, Bulow, who
was then chancellor, was eager to cement the alliance between heavy  industry
and  the great estates in order to get the solid political support of the
Conservative and National-Liberal Parties.  Duties were then increased and
extended to cover livestock products.  Domestic agricultural prices increased
significantly:  for instance, "the average price of German wheat over the
period 1891-1910 was RM 17.60 per 100 kilos;  the equivalent free market price
in London was 12.90."
But, in 1914,  Germany imported large quantities of food and fodder,
particularly barley and maize, from Russia.  During the war, food supplies
declined drastically because of  the blockade and declines in domestic yields.
By the end of  the 1916-17 winter, the daily diet of many was only about 1,000
calories.  This had a  major impact on the collective mentality regarding
agricultural affairs.  Food security became a  major policy objective and this
lasted for at least half a century.  This concern may still be alive today.
After the war agricultural reconstruction proceeded fairly rapidly.  Prices
were fairly stable until 1924 but they fell afterwards.  In 1925,  the rightist
coalition in power reestablished tariffs against the opposition of the SPD,
which continued to defend only the interests of urban workers.  Most
economists were then in favor of  free trade  (16).
Continued price declines stirred up peasant agitation in the  late twenties,
leading to the establishment of a "Green Front" and the adoption of flexible
tariffs  in 1929.  Surpluses, particularly of rye, accumulated, which led to
further Government intervention, this time on the domestic market.  These
measures did not suffice, given the sluggish demand resulting from the general
economic  crisis.  As a result, the Nazis,  in the thirties, easily succeeded in
securing the peasants'  support as  they appeared to  take the bull by the horns,
cutting off German agriculture from the outside world.  This was  in line both
with the preparation of the war, which required food self-sufficiency, and
with the Nazi ideology giving the peasant an essential role in maintaining the
purity of the "Nordic race."  In the same perspective, support was given to
small fawily farms in the form of debt repayment and security of tenure.
According to Cecil:  "By 1938 impressive results were being registered;  the
country was self-sufficient in bread grains.  Evidently the price paid by
5/  It is  precisely the failure of this prediction which led Kautsky to his
masterful  study  of  the  "agrarian question"  (15).
45farmers,  in terms of subordination to a powerful bureaucracy, was a high one
but they could feel that they had regained a place of respect in the community
and would not again be left at the mercy of harsh economic forces."  This
success of the Nazi Government had a lasting impact after the war.  The new
regime could not have afforded to bear the same negative image as the Weimar
Republic.  Support to peasants has continued.
The main impact of World War II on future agricultural policy was to
strengthen the concern for security of food supply  in the public-at-large and
among politicians.  The sense of urgency was greater after the war as
partition had in effect cutoff the western zones, which formed the Federal
Republic, from its traditional eastern supplies.  This  and the tensions of the
cold war probably explain the decision to heavily protect domestic agriculture
from free-market forces.  With industrial  and general economic growth, the
standard of  living in the population-at-large increased rapidly, and,  thus,
farmers continued to appear relatively disadvantaged and deserving special
treatment.  It is  true that economists have argued for a long time that  it
would be more efficient to promote structural changes in order to make
agriculture competitive.  Indeed they had an influence in the national debate,
which produced the famous agricultural law in 1955;  measures to increase the
size of holdings were taken and had a positive impact.  But, these were not a
substitute for high prices, as appeared clearly when prices were to be
harmonized with those of neighboring countries  in order to set up a European
Common Market.
Historical Lessons
This brief review of  the historical developments of agricultural policies in
France, the U.K.,  and Germany should be sufficient to  illustrate several
points which were very influential in the debates about the establishment of
the CAP almost 20 years ago, about the admission of Britain 10 years ago,  and
about the maintenance or the reform of the CAP today:
o  Government intervention is general and pervasive;  its  legitimacy is  not
questioned by any significant segment of  society.  It  is  widely accepted
that the farm sector should not be left  to free-market economic forces.
In this regard,  it should perhaps be stressed that  interventions actually
affecLt many domains, much more numerous than those which have been touched
upon in this paper.
o  The degree of protection from world markets has varied  in time and  space.
Historically, France and Germany have been much more insulated than the
U.K.  These three examples suggest that the degree of protection depends
upon the economic, social, and political place of farmers  in society.
But, in all three countries the extreme diversity of fatrmers'  situations
does not seem to have had a significant impact on domestic price and
market policies.
The Common Agricultural Policy
As Pompidou, then Prime Minister of France, explained clearly in 1965  in an
interview to Le Monde:  "The Rome Treaty, as  it had been conceived actually
created only an industrial common market.  But such a common market put French
industry in direct competition with the outside, particularly with the
powerful German industry.  It was acceptable only if  it was offset by an
agricultural Common Market providing our agriculture with important outlets at
46remunerative prices thus permitting the Government, unburdened of the
necessity to support agriculture, to diminish the costs born by industry."
This candid statement of the French position was never questioned.  It was
essentially accepted by France's most powerful new partner, as  the German
Government soon imposed, at great political risk, to its farmers  the principle
of common European prices, which meant a reduction of German prices.  This
particular treatment of  agriculture led  to the paradoxical situation where
agricultural policy became the most important element of Community affairs.
Thus, debates about agriculture have in a way become the testing ground  for
Europeanism, a situation which has probably helped to maintain the principles
of the CAP but which in the long run may be damaging both to agriculture and
to the European ideal.  Before drawing the implications of this situation for
our analysis  in terms of costs, it  is,  however, necessary to recall briefly
the main features of the CAP and to point out the elements which remain under
national control.
Common Features.  Numerous descriptions of the CAP  are available./  Thus,
only the essential elements will be briefly recalled here.  The first
objective was to achieve a common market for agricultural products.  This
objective is  to be related to the general objectives of the Treaty of Rome:
to achieve the union of  the people of Europe, to increase the standard of
living of all Europeans, and  to promote the accelerated development of the
poorest regions.
More specifically, the famous Article 39 of  the treaty spells out the
following objectives for agricultural policy:
a. Increase agricultural productivity through technical progress  and the
promotion of an optimal use of resources, particularly labor;
b. Ensure an equitable standard of  living  to the agricultural population,
in particular by an increase of the income of  those who work in
agriculture;
c. Stabilize markets;
d. Guarantee the security of supply;
e. Ensure reasonable prices to consumers.
Of course the world has changed since 1958;  new objectives,  concerning  for
instance the protection of the environment, the welfare of the consumers, or
regional development, would occupy a more prominent place if the treaty was
rewritten today.  However, it is  important to keep in mind the objectives
pursued by a policy when one assesses its  costs.  We will come back to this
later.
Price and Market Policy.  The establishment of  a common market led directly to
a price and market policy, which was supplemented only about 10 years  later by
a structural policy.  The pursuit of the objectives spelled out in Article 39
was undertaken through the adoption of three principles guiding the
elaboration of market intervention mechanisms suited to every category of
products:
a. Unicity of the market, that  is,  creation of a single domestic market in
which each national market, for example, the French or the Dutch
market, is a regional one, as, for instance, the California market in
6/  See as an example (14).
47the United States.  This means that Community  institutions  alone  are
responsible  for the  day-to-day  management  of  policy  instruments.
b. Community preference, that  is, market intervention  mechanisms,  must  be
such that for the same product all buyers within the Community are
incited to satisfy their needs from within the Community rather than
from outside.
c.  Common  financial responsibility, that  is,  the  intervention  costs,  are
supported by the Co  nunity as a whole.  This  has  been  achieved  through
the  creation  of  a  common  fund,  best  known  by  its French  acronym,
FEOGA.  Accordingly, levies  collected in Rotterdam, Rouen, Hamburg, or
Liverpool go into FEOGA, even if  they go through the Dutch, French,
German,  or British Treasury.
The specifics of the intervention mechanisms vary from one category of
products to another, and this has  important consequences as  it leads to great
variations in the degree of protection.  But, since this section is  devoted to
common features,  it is sufficient to concentrate here  on  the  similarities
rather than on the differences among products.
For all products which have the benefit of an intervention, the Community,
through its Council of Ministers,  fixes a target or indicative price every
year.  From this level are derived both an intervention price,  (that is,  a
price level such that if  the market price falls below  it,  intervention  buying
by official intervention agencies becomes mandatory),  and  a  threshold  price
(that is,  a price level where if  the world-market is  below  it,  the  difference
between the two  levels  is  collected as a levy on imports  and  paid  as  a  subsidy
to exporters, called a "restitution"  . This "variable levy-restitution"
scheme applies directly to cereals, and  indirectly to  poultry  and  pork.  It  is
often  and,  rather  justly,  taken  as  the  basic  structure  of  the  CAP
market-intervention mechanisms.  Actually, the instruments  used  are  extremely
numerous  and  diverse:  Oilseeds  are  subsidized;  sugarbeets  have  the benefit  of
a price-support scheme, but within three types of quotas; milk has the added
feature of a coresponsibility  levy on producers; durum  wheat  has  a
deficiency-payment  scheme;  cut  flowers  are protected only  through  a  customs
duty.
In spite of this diversity of policy instruments,  the respect of the three
principles  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  truly  common  market.  It  is  probably
of historical significance that this major objective was  reached in less  than
10  years.  The  first proposals  were  officially  put  forth  by  the  Commission  on
June 30,  1960,  and all major agricultural markets were unified by the summer
of 1968, while the customs union was achieved on July 1, 1968.  Soon, however,
the invention of the Monetary Compensatory Amounts  (MCA's) dealt a very
serious  blow  to  this achievement,  as  we  will  see  in  more.detail  below.
One result of  the diversity of market-intervention measures is  that, if  the
degree of protection from the world market is high for some products, it is  at
the  same  time  quite  low  for  others.  This  has  led  to  considerable  debate
within  Europe  and  also  with its  trading partners,  as  exemplified  in  the
various rounds of trade negotiations in the GATT.  It has also led to
significant  domestic-market  stability  and  to  large  surpluses  for  some
products, particularly cereals and dairy, and,  consequently, contributed to
world-market  instability.
48Structural Policies
Price support policies have long been criticized as  inefficient and
inequitable.  They are not equitable because they provide the largest income
support to the  largest, that  is,  the richest, producers.  They are not
efficient because they slow down the necessary adjustment in farm structure
Which would bring about a better allocation of resources.  We shall discuss
below the  limits of  these arguments but they are sufficient for our present
purpose, as they provide the theoretical  basis of  the structural policies to
be discussed here.
The debate about the most efficient farm structure has a long history and is
still open today.  Numerous authors have believed  that  industrialization was
the keyword characterizing  the transformation of agriculture.  The brief
historical sketch presented above has only alluded to some of the debates and
policy measures regarding agricultural structure in the three countries
reviewed..  In France, the Gaullist Government brought about a major change in
agricultural policy emphasis.  The price-escalation-with-inflation mechanism
was abandoned and  the passing of  the Agricultural Orientation Act of 1960 and
the Complementary Act of  1962 launched major structural programs promoting  the
early retirement of old farmers, the migration and training for
nonagricultural  jobs of farmers or of their children willing to  leave
agriculture, and the establishment of  institutions  intervening on the land
market to facilitate farm consolidation.  But,  at the Community level,  the
structural question had not really been publicly discussed before the
spectacular presentation of the famous "Mansholt Plan" in 1968.  This  candid
presentation of a policy designed to shrink the agricultural  sector, in terms
of production, labor employed, and land use, faced a tremendous public
outcry.  Farmers were in an uproar and many politicians were upset with
Mansholt for saying publicly What everybody knew but would not admit.  In
addition,  the accelerated rhythm of change, Which was  thus suggested, was
deemed socially unacceptable and therefore politically infeasible.  Thus,  it
is not surprising that the plan was not adopted but that a few years  later a
watered-down version of the same ideas was embodied  in the so-called
structural directives which constitute the essential structural component of
the CAP.
As emphanizod by Fennell (7),  the corresponding measures, financed out of the
Guidance Section of FEOGA, are more flexible than the market regulations
presented above.  They leave a wider margin of maneuver to national
governments for their application.  In addition, they provide only partial
financing, the balance being met by the national government and,  also, even
the recipient  farmer.  Two measures stem directly from the spirit of the
Nansholt Plan:  The aid to farm modernization  (directive 72/159) and the early
retirement scheme (directive 72/160).  The former essentially provides
farmers, satisfying specific conditions, with investment  aid, mainly
subsidized credit.  The latter provides older farmers, willing to retire and
to  let their land serve for farm consolidation, with monetary incentives.  In
several countries this early retirement scheme works as a  supplement or,
sometimes, a  substitute to similar national programs which existed earlier.
Elsewhere it  does not seem to have had a  very great impact.  The former, which
is  much more selective in  terms of  its  target group, has had an impact on the
distribution of  subsidized credit.  Paradoxically, it  has often had, as a
consequence, an increase in  mik production, already a  surplus commodity in
the EEC.  This results from the eligibility criteria.  Farmers must elaborate
a  development plan.  They are eligible for help if,  at the beginning of the
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reasonably.-  ant-iciPpated that at -the-  end of thel  it  will be at  least equal
expandin  g  .theirentemrpr  is.swill:me-et thsecriteria.  In  addition, these
farmers mst meet soe  requireents in  terms o
education,  and they mus  e  farm accounts  ofastadard type.
Thee  remay  thermesresAimig  t-the general uplift of poorly skilled -There.  are.i.  oman  orii~~1;  -mea sU  -mii3U~~~i  :e'e
famr  orathe.  sprtof  frmers in  various'ty
hese measursarapplical eithr  or  specicproductssuch as win
An  -,s  'eures  n  SUP i  e  regions.  S  i  n  s'L.  the case  for the -measuportofmountain
s'  asures.. . een agr and hil farm  ig.1  O-f-n  e  eshavebeed  upon
by'the Council  of----.  Minsters,  ina  a  very.  ad hoc fashion,  as part of a  global
in  ne  annualf  negotiaton or aother..The expression "the
Mediterrnean packae  used a  few years agonBrussel
this.  respect.-,,-:
Th.he-pejoratiVe toneof  -thesecomments should-not,  however, be-taken as
derogatory."  The.e  measures  ref  lectthe.  nature  -of the Commnity decisionmaking
proes.  s  rsutisitcocevalethat  an added emphasis on "integrated proes~s  itjlt C  ble.-~~t-a:
regi  onal  dveope-nt"  ias  apparentl  y-  .. contemplated at the present time in  at
least.. some'  circles-  of theally  feaible way out of
the cur  t  situtn:where agricultural market suport eats up about 70
percent  of thetalCom  ni4"ty -budget.
The.  t  n,  :;  :::~i~:.: ~
Te  Movemet  Towrds--_ Renaionl  iation
As theCAP has mainly*beena  :market..poli-cy  Andasgovernment intervention has
touched  for many de~~~~4cadesinallcutis  ra  ra  fdomains,its 41~1 _::cour  -.. ar, a
clar t  hatthe CAP  has o  been  one,  albeit  impo  t  acuI  tural1
poicies with  tein  teEEC.  Astoother poicsaffectiglong-term adjustments
of agriculture'tochanges  i economic  and.socialconditions,  we will1touch
unLheB  ,anter element  of  nationaIaition'stems from the ppon  eti'here  e.::-:Bu  .t  o
-exceptions,  begun as arly as 1969--the-year fo  n  e  thcompletI nee  olcJowi. S. t h  on of  the ~ commo-n  -- mark-  tothe princpeI  f.un  I  city..Of pie
Poice  Ifuencinw.-Lbn'  .erm.:A.djustments.  hefatthat various national
governmens have pusued f.or  Manyyears  -specifc1  trcurl  1olces  was
aleay mentind  I  ion,  eph  sisshuld'.:be-  placed on the various
polic ies.. regarding  .- m  thepromtion  f  knowledgead techno  logy.  tagl
enough,'thesepoiies,  whichn.'.are. more.-.and  more,  r  ecognized -as critil-  fo  th
arCu  ltural' develo  pmepnt-of less:.developed  countries  (LDCs), ~have received
very l.Iittle  attention.-in .Comnnitydebates.-..Yet,  te range' of policies in
th  is 'general area  is'vry wdeand theirposible long-term impact
sign'-i,  i  fitiwnt  vrirt+  yarnao  c  n-*an  sar appenaeAuhmr economial  to poduce  hnbeeit wsug  ar;tak  odifrniltes  ofhMn
institutions  in member countries  rvery  ierse  In  the fields of extension
50and promotion of  technical progress, national authorities spend large amounts
of money in very diverse  forms and probably with very unequal effectiveness at
the national as well as regional levels.
Other important domains of intervention include infrastructural public
investments,  investment support to  farmers, and help to marketing
organizations.  About these we know that they are also  important and diverse;
but  the truth of the matter is  that, to this writer's knowledge at  least,
there is  no publication that systematically describes  and compares these
measures, not to  speak of any comprehensive analysis of  their impact on
agriculture in the various countries.
The Monetary Compensatory Amounts  (MCA's).  To recall briefly, in 1969 when
the French franc was devalued and a few months later the Mark revalued, the
respective Governments decided  that they could not respect the principle of
the common price for agricultural products, expressed in  the common unit of
account.  The reason was  inflation, which would follow the devaluation, and
the interest of the German farmers who would have had to accept a reduction of
the prices expressed in marks, that is,  the prices which they received.  It
was felt that temporary levies  and subsidies would permit countries to weather
the monetary storm.  Thus, the  famous MCAs and  "green currencies" were born.
Actually the successive devaluations and revaluations have been such that MCAs
have ever since constituted a quasi-permanent feature of the European
agricultural  scene.  This means that there is  not one single price and that
farmers  in strong currency countries have had a competitive advantage over
their colleagues  in weaker countries  (19).
The decision process regarding each country's MCAs has been such that a  great
degree of  flexibility is  kept by each national government.  Thus,  as  argued by
many authors (11, 21,  22),  the decisions regarding agricultural price levels
have been, to a great extent, renationalized.  Whether this  is  to be regretted
or not is a question on which economists differ.  Ironically, for those who
advocate the objective neutrality of the social scientists,  one cannot but be
struck by the fact that French economists  lament  this breach in one  supposedly
fundamental principle of the CAP, whereas German and British economists admire
the MCA system because  it is  flexible and "remarkably well suited"  to meeting
the requirements  arising out of "the great  disparities between member states
in terms of economic performance and  farm structure"  (11).
The establishment of a European common market for agriculture  in the sixties
was undoubtedly a great achievement of historical significance.  But it  has
not been possible to develop a full-fledged, comprehensive agricultural
full-fledged, policy.  The structural component is still very weak and, more
importantly, many policies affecting the  long-term evolution of agriculture
remain within the sphere of national decisions.  In addition, the introduction
and  the performance of the MCAs has given back to national governments a great
degree of freedom in decisions regarding the domestic level of  agricultural
prices.  These developments may be interpreted as reflecting deep divergences
of view among member countries regarding the long-term future of their
agricultures and the policies needed to bring about the necessary
adjustments.  In this perspective the well-known annual disputes regarding
agricultural prices and budget contributions could be taken as other
illustrations of these divergences.  It  is against this background that we can
come at last to the main topic of this paper;  the question of policy costs.
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Concepts and Approaches.  A commonly accepted definition of policy costs is
implied by the following quotation:  "Certainly it  is  not  difficult  to  show
that the CAP makes economic nonsense, in that there  are  alternative  policies
which  could  yield  efficiency  gains  relative  to  the  existing  policy,  but  which
need not involve any deterioration in the extent to which the policy achieves
what usually regarded as its major objectives"  (19).  Furthermore,  the  present
policy costs more than alternative policies would; without  sacrificing  any
major  objective  it  would  be  possible  to  achieve  efficiency  gains,  that  is,  to
save costs.  In the same paper Ritson cogently argues that  this situation can
easily be explained if one recognizes that  the Community  policy  decisionmaking
process  does  not  operate  as  a  search  for  the  optimum  of  a  Community  welfare
function,  but it  is the result of a compromise among national  governments
seeking  to maximize their gains and minimize their losses.  This  view has  led
to  a  surge  of  interest,  particularly  in  the United  Kingdom,  for  the  question
of the benefits and costs of EEC membership.  Precisely such is  the title of a
workshop which was held at Wye College in 1979.  In the first sentence of  the
first paper of  the workshop, Reid emphasized:  "The cost of membership of  the
European  Community has in recent months become a highly  political  topic"
(25).  This  is  particularly  true  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  has  led  the  British
Government  to  insist  that  its  contribution  to  the  Community  budget  be
diminished.  One may  wonder  whether  or  not  this  particular  point  of  view  on
policy  costs  has  not  unduly  attracted  the  economists'  attention  and  excluded
other aspects which are also very important for policy analysis.7/  But,
assessing  all  the  transfers  among  countries  resulting  from  a  given  policy  is
already  very  difficult.  An  effort  to  simplify  the  problem  has  been  presented
by Godley, of  the Cambridge Economic  Policy Group, which  has  done  influential
work on the cost for the United Kingdom of EEC membership (19).
Godley writes, "In  this paper we are not discussing the  so-called  'direct'
costs  to Britains of EEC membership  in which comparison is  being made with a
hypothetical position in which we are not members.  What  we  are  doing  is
examining how the present system of financial transfers between member
countries is  working...that is,  examining the patterns of transfers."  The
objective  appears  straightforward  and  useful  but,  as  explained  on  the  next
page,  the  financial  effects  ("in principle  quite  easy  to  calculate")  fall  in
two  categories:  the net  cash  payment  to  the  Community  Budget  and  "the  costs
incurred  by  countries  which  import  food  for  the rest  of  the  Community  at
prices higher than they would otherwise have to pay"(9).  In other words, a
reference  situation has  to  be  defined  as  a  basis  for  comparison.  Tn her
review  of  the  workshop,  Loseby  (18)  emphasizes  this  point:  "Numerous
methodological  difficulties  were  encountered,  which can  probably  be  reduced  to
the basic  problem  of  defining  a  reference  situation  against  which  to  measure
the  effects  of the  CAP."
7/  Having  pleaded  elsewhere  for  the  development  of  an  "analytical  political
economy"  (20),  I  do  not  want  to  imply  here that political  considerations  can
be  excluded  from  economic  analysis.  My  point  is that they  should  not  blind
the analysts or completely distort the conception of the tasks which they have
to perform.
52The fundamental problem encountered in calculating national costs and benefits
was very well described by Koester during the same Wye workshop:  "Estimation
of the cost of the CAP to member countries is virtually impossible without
making strong value judgments.  If costs are defined as opportunity costs, the
identification of positive costs  indicates that the nation would be better off
with a different policy.  Such a statement could only be established if  the
objective function for that society was known and the alternative policy (the
reference system) must be acceptable in every respect;  that is,  politically,
socially, and administratively"(17).
The purpose of these comments is  to emphasize that economists must not forget
the limitations of the hypotheses which they accept  implicitly or explicitly.
But, this does not  imply that the exercise of  calculating national costs is
useless.  Researchers have identified four types of costs:  the net budget
costs, balance of payments costs, costs to consumers  in the form of higher
prices, and the effect on total real income in different member states.  But,
these do not really capture the changes  in the welfare of consumers,
producers, and taxpayers arising from policy changes,  which must, of course,
be included in a comprehensive assessment of policy costs.  As  explained by
Buckwel.  and others,  "The political debate of  the last  two years has focused
almost entirely on the net budgetary costs to particular member states.  This
ignores the cost to consumers throughout the Community who pay more for their
food  than they might do under a different policy.  It also  ignores the  cost of
the misallocation of resources resulting from the over-expansion of
agricultural output.  Within the neoclassical economics tradition these
welfare impacts are approached through the Marshallian concept of  producers'
and consumers'  surpluses.  For agricultural policy, this approach was  first
used in the field of  international trade to estimate the welfare cost of
protection (5,  6).  Following this  lead, Josling has proposed a comprehensive
conceptual framework "to examine the relative efficiency of  several
alternative methods of price support  for agricultural commodities"  (13).  The
link with international trade is  direct, as he stresses  in a footnote that his
analysis refers only to goods competing with imports.  Recently, Buckwell and
others have followed this approach to measure the costs of the CAP.
Here again, the theoretical limits of  the approach should not be overlooked.
It does permit us to define total costs and  to derive unit average and
marginal costs.  Thus,  it provides criteria  to judge the relative efficiency
of various policies.  But,  it  is subject to the fundamental  limitations of the
Marshallian concept of surplus.  First, as indicated by Boulding, "it is
perhaps better to call it  the buyer's  surplus;  the corresponding concept for
sellers may be called  'sellers' surplus"(2).  But,  the most important  limit of
the concept, as used for policy analysis in terms of costs,  is that it  assumes
that  the social welfare function can be aggregated  from individual utility
functions.  Boulding, for  instance, shows that  from an  individual's
indifference curve, one can derive an individual's demand curve and that the
corresponding buyer's surplus  is  equal to "the compensating payment which
would compensate for the loss of the market,"  if  the marginal utility of money
can be taken as constant.  For computing a policy total welfare cost, we must
aggregate the individual's surpluses so defined;  one must further accept to
add  in one lump sum consumers'  surplus, producers' surplus, and budget cost.
At this stage, the judgment of  the analyst  intervenes.  Analysts must decide
whether or not the assumptions are too heroic for their intellectual
tranquility.  In any case  the assumptions should not be forgotten.
53A final  set of  limitations  of  the  surplus  approach  is  that  it  is  fundamentally
based on partial equilibrium analyses.  Dardis  (1967)  has  carefully  spelled
out  the  limits  resulting  from this  feature:  "The  use  of  partial equilibrium
analyses in  the present study rests on the following assumptions:
1.  The relative unimportance of grain production and trade in  grain in  the
United Kingdom economy;
2.  The  equivalence  of  consumer  prices  to  free  market prices  resulting  from
the employment of a deficiency-payments system;
3. A relatively inelastic domestic supply;
4.  An elastic world supply."
This should be sufficient  to  i1  lustrate the type of  assumptions  which  must  be
made to ignore the macroeconomic effects of a policy change.
The analysis in  terms of  costs of the CAP has often been  unduly  restricted  to
the political debate regarding budget contributions.  Economists have
identified other types of costs due to the trade and welfare effects of the
policy.  These can indeed  be viewed as the total costs  of  the  policy.  But,
estimating  them  is  fraught with  many  theoretical  difficulties,  in  addition  to
the practical and technical ones which have not been discussed  in  this  paper.
In my  judgment,  the  most  serious  limitation  stems  from  the  use  of  static
partial equilibrium analysis  which  is  not  well  suited  for  analyzing  the
long-term impact, particularly  in terms of possible resource  misallocation,  of
the  CAP.  These  effects  could  only  be  assessed  in the  framework  of  a  dynamic
model, reflecting changes in farm structures, labor and  other  input use,
technical and institutional changes, etc.  This implies  that long-term  total
costs are not of much use because they are too far removed from the concept of
opportunity costs 8/ and they rely on  shaky assumptions about  the  existence  of
a  long-term  equilibrium.  By  contrast,  it  may  be  very  useful  to  identify  the
diverse short-term costs associated with a contemplated change  in policy.
This  is  what  we  try  to  illustrate  in  the  following  section.
Costs Associated With Dairy Policy Alternatives
Here, an attempt is  made at identifying various costs associated with possible
changes in  the CAP.  No attempt will be made at adding up these costs,  in  the
belief  that  identification of diverse costs,  together with the identification
of the gainers and losers, is  more useful in  the policy debate than a  global
judgment about the effectiveness of each policy.  In  this respect a  serious
limitation of the exercise should be pointed out:  The analysis  is  conducted
at the Community level, and no attempt will be made to disaggregate at
8/  The  previous  presentation of  the historical  background  and  of  the
structure of  European agricultural policies  should  hopefully  be  sufficient  to
convince the reader that there is  no reference situation, such as totally free
trade for instance, against which to usefully compute total cost.
54national levels. As already indicated, domestic costs will only be taken into
account.  Assuredly,  the costs to outside countries can  be  very  important  but
they are outside the scope of this paper.9/
First, I  tried to build a specific enough analytical  framework  for  the
agricultural sector as a whole.  But,  this proved to  be  inadequate  because,  as
seen above, there exists a large variety of measures supporting the various
markets;  it  is not possible to build a specific enough  frame  of  analysis  to
handle all these instruments  at once, or this can only  be  done  in  very  general
and not very useful terms.  Therefore, I chose to work on the example of a
market for one product.  Milk was chosen because dairy policy is  one of the
most controversed in the EEC.  Dairy surpluses have accumulated  and  their
disposal takes a large share of FEOGA expenses.  A coresponsibility levy,  that
is,  ultimately  a  decrease  in  the  level  of  price  support,  has  been  instituted
and  this has been the object of numerous debates, particularly  between  the  EEC
Commission and farm organizations as well as among farmers,  many  of  them  being
upset with their organization officials for having accepted the scheme.
Given the current debate about CAP problems two alternatives  to  the  current
policy will be examined:  a reduction in the level of price support and the
establishment of marketing quotas with differentiated prices.  10/  Each  one
constitutes a prominent feature of proposals made over  the  last  few  years:
for the  former by the Commission and for the  latter by  the  French  Socialist
Party.
Reduction In Level of Price Support
The analysis of the effects of a decline  in the price-support level is
conducted  in figure 1.  It  is assumed that at intervention price Pi,  the
quantity produced (Qp) is determined on the domestic supply function  (Sd),
while quantity consumed (Qc) is determined on the domestic demand function.
Neglecting intervention storage, or assuming  that it  is  only  temporary,  the
difference  must  be  exported.  So  if Qe is quantity  exported,  Qe  =  Qp  - Qd.
For  each intervention-price level, a quantity to be  exported  can  thus  be
derived;  this is  expressed on the right-hand side of  figure 1 by the export
supply function  (Se).  In present circumstances,  the corresponding point on
the (Se)  curve is well-above the corresponding demand curve  (De) on the export
market, which sets the level of price (Pe) at which Qe can be exported.  A
restitution equal  to Pi - Pe has to be paid out by FEOGA.  When the
intervention price is decreased from Pi  to Pi',  under usual assumptions
9/  For a recent evaluation see  (25), who also show that the results can be
somewhat surprising.  Thus, they estimated that if a 50-percent reduction
across the board in tariffs and other trade barriers for 99 commodities in 19
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  countries  would
greatly benefit  the  LDCs  as  a  whole,  it  would  not  help  the  low-income  group  of
LDC's, the welfare gains on exports being offset by losses on reduced imports
of cereals.
10/  For a recent and general presentation see  (14);  a good collection of
papers regarding national attitudes was presented in Bruses in 1979;  see the
papers  by  Clerc,  Marsh,  Ferro,  Lechi  and  Ricci,  and  Tangermann,  in  (jA).
55Fig 1  :  Impact  of  a  decline  in  price  support  Level.
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Qregarding short-term demand and  supply elasticities, less is  produced  (Q'p),
more is domestically consumed  (Q'c),  less will have to be exported  (Q'e),
fetching a higher price  (P'e) on the export market.
The budget, trade, and welfare  impacts  (costs) are straightforward:
Budget savings are equal to:  Qe (Pi - Pe) - Q'e  (P'i - P'e).  The amount
saved is the greater:  the larger the decrease in price intervention, the
greater the elasticity of domestic supply;  the greater the elasticity of
domestic demand, the lower the elasticity of export demand.
The balance of payments  impact is equal to  Q'eP'e - Qe Pe.  It is a
function of domestic supply and demand elasticities and export demand
elasticity.  If the  latter is larger than 1, a decline in intervention
price brings about a loss  in foreign-exchange earnings.
The consumers' gain, estimated as the change  in consumers'  surplus, is the
area PiACP'  ij.
Obviously the greater the price decline, the larger is  the consumers'
gain;  the latter also increases with the elasticity of domestic demand.
The producers' loss, estimated  in the same manner, is  the area
PiP'BDi.  Of course,  it depends on the extent of the reduction in
intervention price, and on the elasticity of domestic supply;  the greater
that elasticity, the lower the loss of producers.
The value of resources transferred out of agriculture  is  equal to area
QpQ'pDB.  It is  the greater the larger the decline  in intervention
price, and the larger the elasticity of supply.
These results  shed some light on the  debates about  this policy alternative.
Of course, producers are against it, while those who have the consumers' and
taxpayers' welfare at heart are for it.  Let us note  that, beyond this obvious
conflict of interest, much depends on supply and demand elasticities which are
poorly known.  If the domestic supply and demand elasticities are  low and the
elasticity of export demand relatively high, a likely situation, the
consumers'  gain is  not very large, while the producers'  loss is large and  the
impact on the balance of payments is  negative.  Since, in addition, the amount
of resources transferred to other sectors was  limited,  one can understand why
it  was only under budget pressure that this policy change was  proposed.
Quotas and Differentiated Prices
For the sake of clarity, only a simple version of this policy will be
discussed here.  The analysis is  conducted  in figure 2, drawn in the same
manner as figure 1.  With current policy, the same  initial situation prevails,
characterized by Pi, Qp, Qc,  Qe, and Pe.  Let us assume now that up to a total
quantum q, the same intervention price Pi prevails and that beyond the quantum
a, lower intervention price P'i is  enforced.  We assume further than the
quantum is distributed in individual quotas  to producers in such a manner that
they all face a  marginal price P'j.  Thus, Q'p is  produced at the
intersection of  (Sd) with price P'j.  The export supply curve changes since
Q'e = Q'p - Qc,  the price to consumers having not changed this time.  (Se)
"tilts" counter-clockwise to  (S'e).  The same export demand curve gives us the
price P'e at which Q'e can be exported.
57The  budget,  trade,  and  welfare  effects  can  be  analyzed  as  follows:
Budget savings are represented by the shaded area on  the  left-hand  side  of
figure  2.  This  results  from the  fact  that q  - Qc  is  still  paid  by  the
intervention agency at price Pi, while Q'p - q  is  bought  at P'i.  In  the
initial situation, budget cost was Qe (Pi - Pe).  In the  new  situation  it
is  (q - Qc)  Pi +  (Q'p - q) P'i - Q'eP'e.
The amount saved depends on the elasticity of supply, the elasticity of
export demand, the quantum, and the price differentials.  It  is  greater
the  larger the price  differential,  the  smaller the  quantum,  the higher  the
elasticity of supply, and the smaller the elasticity  of  export  demand.
The balance of payments effect  is Q'eP'e - Qe Pe.  For  a  given  price
differential  it  depends  only  on  the elasticity  of  domestic  supply,  which
is the same as the elasticity  of export supply since  domestic  consumption
does not change, and on the elasticity of export demand.  Here again, if
the latter is greater than 1, the new policy leads to a loss  in
foreign-,exchange  earnings.
Domestic consumers are not affected.
Producers'  loss is represented by the area EBDF.  It  is the greater the
smaller,  the quantity, the larger the price differential, and the smaller
the  elasticity  of  supply.
The  amount  of  resources  transferred  to  other sectors  of  the  economy  is
represonted by area QpQ'pBD.  As in  the previous  case,  it  is  the
greater the  larger the price  differential,  and  the  larger  the elasticity
of  supply.
These results  also shed  some  light on  the  debates  around  this  policy
alternative.  One can  understand why  it  is  attractive  in  the  short  run  in
spite  of  the well-known  long-term  problems posed  by  quotas.  11/
Budget expenses can be reduced, without hurting producers too ouch.  Besides,
even  though  (or  perhaps  because)  there has  been  little  discussion  about
procedures  for  distributing quotas  among  producers, the  scheme  seems  to  lend
itself easily to some income redistribution amons dairy farmers, protecting
the  smaller  ones,  while  permitting  an  increase  in  the  price  differential if
large surpluses  would  pile  up  again.
Comparison Between  the Two Policy Alternatives
The  comparison  between  the  two  alternatives,  to  be  useful for policy
discussions,  ust  be  done  holding  some  variable  constant  (usually  a policy
objective  variable)  and  investigating  differences  in  other  dimensions  of the
problem.  For  the  purpose  of analysis,  it  is  convenient  to  compare  the  impact
of the two  policy  changes  for the  same  reduction  in  price  Pi - P'i,  even
though  prices  are policy  instruments  and  not  policy  objective  variables.
11/  (12),  Hathaway,  1963).
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SdFrom the previous analyses, it  appears that the same  price  differential  brings
about  the same reduction in  total supply and the same  reduction  in  the  use  of
mobile  resources.  With a  reduction in  the level of  support,  consumers  gain
more, producers lose more, and the reduction in  budget  expenditures  is  larger
than with the establishment of marketing quotas and of a  price differential
equal to  the price  reduction of the first alternative.  The  balance  of
payments  effect  is  larger  in absolute  value  with  the  former  than  with  the
latter, its  sign depending on the elasticity of export demand.
The preference for one, rather than the other, of these two alternatives will
thus depend on the relative weights given to these various  gains  and  losses.
In  any case,  it  seems  difficult  to  incorporate  them  in  a  single  social utility
function,  of  which  one  could  then  seek  the  optimum.
In  order  to  clarify  the  choice,  it  would  be  more  useful  to  compare  the  two
alternatives  for  the  same  value  of  a  given  policy  objective,  for  instance,  for
the same amount of budget savings.  Simple algebra shows  that  equalizing  the
two expressions  of budget savings given above leads to  one  equation  of  the
first degree relating three instrument variables (decline  in  price  support
level, quantum, and price differential),  the parameters  of  the  equation,
depending on the initial price and quantity values, and  the  elasticities  of
supply and demand.  This means that it  is  possible to achieve  the same budget
savings  but,  if  a  quota  scheme  is  enforced,  the  price  differential  must  be
greater than the reduction in  the price-support level of the first
alternative.  The larger the quantum, the greater the  price  differential  must
be.  Assessing geometrically the impact of such comparable  policy  alternatives
on the other variables becomes unmanageable.  One would  need  to  resort  to  a
simulation  exercise.
This exercise will hopefully be sufficient to illustrate  the  limits  of  policy
analysis  in  terms  of  costs.  Within  these  limits,  the usefulness  of  such  an
analysis  should, however, not be neglected.  One may perhaps  regret  that
agricultural  economists have given too much attention to  long-term  costs,
which in  my view at least are not very meaningful and  only  very  partial,  while
neglecting the short-term impacts, which can more easily be analyzed in
reference  to  a partial  equilibrium  framework,  and  which  weigh  so  much  in the
policy decision process.
Of course,  this  state-of-the-art is  not  intellectually  satisfying.  Economists
often pride themselves with their ability to pay attention to  long-term
adjustments;  whereas policymakers, particularly politicians, cannot afford to
do it. Thus, the point of view expressed in  this paper tends to undermine the
social function traditionally claimed by economists.
Actually,  the  thrust of  the  argument  is  a  little  more  complicated  than that:
o  Economists  should  be  careful  not  to  oversell  their case.  Economic
analysis  of  policy  issues  is  always  partial and  should  not  be  presented  as
global  and  comprehensive.  In this  respect,  the  concepts  of  long-run  total
cost and effectiveness are dangerous.
o  But,  partial analyses  can  be  very useful  and  concepts  of  short-term  costs
to  various  social  groups  are relevant.
60o  Long-term  impacts  are  of  course  essential  and,  therefore,  should  be
investigated.  Economic  tools  can  be  very  useful  for  that purpose,  so  much
more so if  the analysts are keenly aware of their main limitations.  What
we need are approaches  to the dynamics of adjustments  and of the
interrelationships between economic and political phenomena.
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